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OXI ! NOΌχι στο Σχέδιο Ανάν ! No to the Annan Plan |
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Book is a must-read for those interested in Cyprus problem ANYONE involved, or merely interested, in the Cyprus problem and the United Nations involvement in the efforts for its settlement must read the book by Claire Palley, the eminent British legal expert who served as Constitutional Consultant to the Cyprus government during the long-drawn out United Nations-sponsored reunification talks from 1980-2004. This was strongly stressed by three professors, who are themselves deeply involved in following up and commenting on Cyprus developments, during a presentation of the book at Nicosia's Intercollege last night. The title of the book, "An International Relations Debacle," deals in detail with the UN Secretary-General's Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004 and its culmination with the presentation of the controversial Annan Plan V. The Dean of Intercollege, Professor Van Coufoudakis, said that "this book must be read in depth and seriously by anyone involved in the resolution of the Cyprus problem, or who will likely be involved in another round of negotiations. This well-documented book and the critical insights of the author, is an important testament that will shape any future attempt at a settlement.'' Professor Andreas Theophanous said that the Palley book "provides a detailed and precise account of the events that took place during the period 1999-2004 when the UN was trying to promote a solution. It is no coincidence that she describes the outcome as an "An International Relations Debacle." Michael Attalides, a former ambassador and Director General of the Foreign Ministry, who was himself deeply involved in Cyprus, and who is now one of the Intercollege professors, said that "I cannot imagine that anyone will be able to write about the Cyprus problem again without referring to this book. And clearly this is the book to go to if you wish to learn about the differences between the good offices, mediation, and arbitration, and which side refused which at different stages of the negotiations.'' Experience In his presentation Prof Van Coufoudakis said that the author brought to her task as a consultant to the Cyprus government her "incredible experience, not only through her participation on the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, but also as consultant to the African National Council of Rhodesia, the Northern Ireland Convention and the International Commission of Jurists.'' Her book portrays events from the perspective of one who was close to the negotiations and her account of developments is fully documented with extensive footnotes, references to specific papers and documents exchanged by the parties during the course of 1999-2004. Describing the book, he said that its 450 pages are divided into 18 chapters, 9 major appendices, and a very rich photographic collection with light-hearted captions that supplement this important book. "We should thank the author for this photographic archive. It provides an important visual history of Cyprus since 1954.'' "I should also add that that appendices include extremely useful information such as (a) the now famous 11 points by Turkish Ambassador Ziyal that were virtually incorporated in Annan 5; (b) the response by the government of the Republic to the Secretary General's plan dated March 29, 2004; and (c) a very informative chart of villages, predominantly inhabited by settlers and their voting behaviour in the referendum. "The most important of the appendices is a nearly 40-page comparative chart analysing section-by-section the five plans presented by the Secretary General and his staff.'' He said the book is very timely in view of recent attempts by the Cyprus Government and the United Nations to start new talks on the Cyprus problem. "However, the significance of this book goes well beyond the borders of the Republic of Cyprus. It is a warning of the risks involved for all those who invoke the good offices of the Secretary-General in a conflict-resolution process. It is also a classic case study of how an international institution, like the United Nations, lacking leaders of the calibre of Dag Hammarskjold and U Thant, can violate its own principles and become an agent of influential permanent members of the Security Council, like the United States and the United Kingdom. Disinformation "In the particular case of Cyprus, Kofi Annan and his staff exceeded their jurisdiction; misled the international community in their reports and actions on Cyprus; became parties instead of facilitators in the Cyprus problem and undermined the credibility of the United Nations by attempting to impose a settlement tailor-made by the United States, the United Kingdom and Turkey. "They did so by threat, disinformation, by violating cardinal rules of the UN Charter, Security Council resolutions on Cyprus and European law. Prof. Coufoudakis said that the critique is not against the Cyprus policy of internationalisation pursued since the 1963 crisis. Hypocrites pursuing political goals COUFOUDAKIS said the book's criticism is directed at Kofi Annan and his staff, headed by Alvaro de Soto, who usurped their jurisdiction in order to impose a settlement. De Soto worked closely with British and US officials, like David Hannay, Richard Holbrooke, Alfred Moses and Tom Weston. "In this manner, the UN team abandoned the concept of good offices, became a participant in the Cypriot drama, and identified with one of the parties and its external sponsors.'' "In her analysis of the various Annan plans, the author shows how the UN attempted to trick the government of Cyprus into signing or endorsing a foundation agreement that would bind the parties to the results of the arbitration, or later, on March 25, 2004, to sign a commitment document to an unfinished settlement package. The devil, in reality, was in the details but that was to become clear later. As the United States proceeded with plans to invade Iraq, Turkey received a promise of billions of dollars and American support for Turkey's positions on the Annan plan in return for her participation in the war. Daniel Fried of the Bush administration has admitted that much. Ample proof The US position on the various versions of the Annan plan are ample proof of Fried's position. "Washington, for strategic reasons guided and supported Turkey's EU accession aspirations. By facilitating a solution of the Cyprus problem acceptable to Turkey, Ankara would be given "clean hands" from her occupation of a prospective member of the EU." Prof Coufoudakis provided a brief chapter-by-chapter commentary on the book that also includes Washington's fully-documented heavy financial and political involvement in Cyprus under the guise of creating an environment conducive to peace. He points out that Palley details the issue of the settlers and how that issue was one of the main reasons for the rejection of Annan 5 by the Greek Cypriots. She quotes Mr Pfirter, a Swiss constitutional advisor to de Soto, admitting at a lecture at Bogacici University in Istanbul that the "plan did not foresee that anybody would be forced to leave..." He said that Chapter 9 exposes the manipulative presentational tactics employed by de Soto and his staff who used rhetorical devices to obscure negative details from the Greek Cypriots. Prof Coufoudakis says Palley "concludes with a simple truth, that at Burgenstock the chance for a settlement was lost because Turkey and her allies became too greedy and that the Secretariat, looking for a success that would improve its relations with the United States, decided to settle regardless of justice. "For de Soto, it may have also been a personal issue as well. He wanted to break president Papadopoulos who stood up to him. Thus, the UN exploited the discretion given to the Secretary-General in New York. As a result, human rights, international law, and UN resolutions on Cyprus went out of the window. The priority of a political deal with Turkey had been fully met.'' Coufoudakis praises Palley's analysis of the "real effects" of the plan on Greek Cypriots, and her detailed discussion of the right of the displaced to return to their homes in safety and their right to property. "It is important to note Palley's conclusion that the property provisions were based on a global property exchange with compensation the norm rather than restitution.'' He said that those condemning the Greek Cypriots for their "no" vote, "either did not understand the details of Annan 5, or were misled on the effects of the plan. Those who understood the effects of the plan and yet claimed that it balanced human rights "can only be adjudged hypocrites, pursuing preferred political goals while paying lip service to international law and human rights standards." Coufoudakis said the book concludes with lessons from the experience of 1999-2004. He said "rather than idealising the UN, we should recognise the UN and its Secretariat as a political organisation open to pressures of powerful members who can entangle the Secretariat into pursuing their goals. In view of the Secretariat's recent performance in Cyprus, questions are raised about its ability to be effective in dispute settlement, military occupation, and upholding the law. This is of major consequence to small states.'' He concluded his presentation by congratulating Claire Palley "for a most impressive volume. If we understand her analysis and her disturbing conclusions, we will be better prepared to face the future. Thank you Claire Palley for making this possible for us." UN Secretariat should never engage in arbitration -Attalides DEAN Michael Attalides, in his evaluation, said that “this is a detailed, erudite, dense and earnest book. “What lends it its edge is that the author completely declines to accept that just because Cyprus is small and occupied, it should be treated by different human rights standards and standards of respect for her sovereignty and of the niceties of international law to what other states have a right.'' He said that one of the aspects of the book that he appreciated most “was her clear description and documentation of what I personally had clearly and frustratingly felt in my efforts to understand the Annan Plan: That the principles enunciated in the Foundation Agreement, which, especially in the earlier versions of the plan, appeared fairly straight-forward and acceptable, frequently suffered from successive limitations in the subsequent sections, addenda and legislation, so that they were frequently negated. “The way she puts it on page 33, "the Foundation Agreement was written as the Plan's international marketing tool" is fair. Thus, for example, on page 108, Claire Palley describes how, hidden away in a law regarding the Continental Shelf prepared by the UN, there is a provision resulting in a situation such that, in the area opposite Turkey, Cyprus would have no continental shelf.'' Learned quite a lot Attalides added that he himself “learned quite a lot,'' from the book. “Firstly , the author makes a strong case that the UN Secretary General should never engage in arbitration or even making "bridging proposals" or in "completing gaps." Because such an activity immediately makes the UN Secretariat a party in a sense to the negotiations rather than an impartial facilitator of negotiations.'' He wondered, “as I think that Claire Palley at some point implies, that such a degree of commitment and disappointment and frustration on the part of the UN Secretariat, as resulted from its own excessive involvement, and the disappointment resulting from the rejection of Annan 5 by the Greek Cypriot referendum, may to some extent be responsible for that paragraph, which is hard to reconcile with objectivity, or with detachment, which the Secretary-General inserted in his Report of 28th May 2004, which recommends in paragraph 93 that the Security Council should "give a strong lead to all states to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots, deeming such a move as consistent with Security Council Resolution 541(1983) and 550 (1984)." ``This paragraph is the one which could be used to provide for an alternative solution to the Cyprus problem, alternative to the one provided for in S C resolutions, including 541 and 550; it is alternative because it follows the "Taiwan model" or the "Independent region of the EU" model as a long-term method of attempting to defuse the situation. And it is a model which, though not giving Turkish Cypriots participation in the Republic of Cyprus, or in EU Institutions, also does not give Greek Cypriots any of their land or property back, and leaves the northern part of Cyprus dominated by settlers and the Turkish army.'' Weak explanations Attalides criticises Palley for what he describes as her “rather weak explanations” of the decision by the Greek Cypriot side acceptance that Annan could fill in the gaps in a final settlement. He said though Palley considers, and I agree with her, that the $64,000 question is "Why did the Greek Cypriot side agree to the Secretary-General finalising the text then putting it to referendum...” “I do not consider the above explanations adequate, and nor do I consider her other explanation adequate, which is basically, in her own words, that "they believed that he (the S.G.) would be persuaded by reasonable argument to make the changes the Greek Cypriot side urged in order to have a functional settlement." In other words, the Greek Cypriot side believed that once everything had been reopened to renegotiation, its own view of functionality would predominate over that of Turkey. One wonders how.'' Attalides said that his guess was that the Greek Cypriot side went to New York Onot having fully incorporated into their thinking the real changes on the Turkish side, particularly in Ankara, with the Erdogan government, and were therefore wrong-footed by Denktash's overnight change of position and acceptance of arbitration by the SG. “They then followed in order not to be dubbed the politically intransigent side. Had they done their political homework more thoroughly they would have been better prepared.'' Attalides praises the appendixes to the book, particularly No 6 as an extremely useful table comparing modifications of the various provisions through the four successive versions of the Annan Plan. Only Claire Palley with her vast legal knowledge and her extensive immersion in the Cyprus problem over many years could have prepared this table. “Clearly this book takes a side. And this position clearly justifies the right of the majority of Greek Cypriots to say no to the Annan Plan, and the book castigates the behaviour of the UN Secretariat, EU officials and foreign governments. “I would urge particularly those who disagree with this position politically to read this book. It brings so much to light, that it could form the basis of a beginning of a real dialogue about what the solution of the Cyprus problem should and could look like,'' Attalides said. Cyprus Weekly 30 June 2005
where to buy this book An
International Relations Debacle: The Un Secretary-general's Mission Of Good
Offices In Cyprus 1999-2004 (Paperback)
An
International Relations Debacle: The Un Secretary-general's Mission Of Good
Offices In Cyprus 1999-2004 (Paperback)
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