OXI
! NO !
Cyprus President's letter to
UN Chief
by Apostolis Zoupaniotis
United Nations, Jun 8 (CNA) -- Following is the letter by Cyprus President Tassos
Papadopoulos to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan which was handed to Security
Council members today:
7 June 2004
H.E. Mr. Kofi Annan
Secretary-General Of the United Nations New York
Excellency,
With reference to your
Report on the mission of good offices in Cyprus (S/2004/437), dated 28 May
2004, and further to our recent meeting of 3 June 2004, I would like to convey
to you further my relevant position.
This reply is presented in
full respect for your action in the framework of your mission of good offices
and has been prepared in a constructive and forward looking manner. Indeed, I
take this opportunity, to once more, reiterate my gratitude and appreciation
for your sustained personal efforts towards a settlement in Cyprus.
When reading this Report,
one should, nevertheless, bear in mind that it has been primarily drafted by
those entrusted by you with the role of honest broker and were active
participants throughout the process. Through this Report they assess
effectively the outcome of their own efforts, whilst at the same time
attempting to portray and evaluate the attitude of the parties involved. In
other words, the authors of the report play essentially the role of the judge
and jury of the overall outcome of the negotiation process they presided over.
I welcome, in particular,
the recognition, in the Report, that serious concerns of the Greek Cypriot
community had not been adequately addressed in the final Plan of 31 March 2004,
a fact which weighted heavily on the results of the referendum held on 24 April
2004.
It is regrettable that these
concerns, which I had explained in detail, both orally and in writing, in
Nicosia, through various documents, numbering more than 200 pages of
comprehensive proposals, amongst which one of the most important was the
document of 8 March 2004 concerning the crucial issue of security, were to a
great extent, ignored.
Let me remind you that these
legitimate concerns refer mainly (a) to the question of Turkish mainland
settlers, an issue which I also raised in my two letters I addressed to your
Excellency, on 23 and 25 March 2004, without any response; (b) the permanent
stationing of Turkish military forces in Cyprus, even after Turkey's eventual
accession to the European Union; and (c) the expansion of the guarantor powers'
rights emanating from the Treaty of Guarantee, through the inclusion of an
additional protocol.
You very rightly point out,
in your Report, that there is disagreement over the interpretation of the
rights of the Treaty of Guarantee, between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey.
Given that Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 by invoking this very specific right,
this issue has been of paramount gravity for our side. In order to tackle this
issue, we have proposed the adoption of a triggering off mechanism for the
exercise of the right of intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee. However,
Mr. de Soto refused to discuss the issue and Your Excellency also did not
contemplate this possibility. Even after the presentation of the text of the
final Plan, Cyprus tried to secure a strong resolution under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter and in any event the adoption of a triggering off mechanism. This
attempt of ours, as you very well know, was once more, unsuccessful due to the
strong opposition of the other side.
Another issue of
significance, negatively affecting the negotiating process, which you also
include in your Report, was the lack of sufficient time and the tight deadlines
provided. These factors did not allow either substantial negotiations to take place,
or for an agreed solution to be reached between the two communities.
This is all the more
regrettable, since I had been repeatedly advising, after the collapse of the
talks, at the Hague, in March 2003, that we should not be faced with another
artificial deadline, giving anxiety to the Cypriot people that they would be
besieged and that their legitimate concerns were not given appropriate
consideration. This flawed negotiating method, which resulted in a ten-month
delay in the resumption of the talks, has proved inadequate and
counterproductive. We bear witness to the results of such a method, not only in
the case of Cyprus, but also in other regional conflicts, leading, at best, to
short lived arrangements incapable of bringing about stable and lasting
solutions.
May I point out that the
crucial period of more than a month of the first phase of negotiations, in
Nicosia, as you also point out in your Report, was allowed to elapse without any
progress due to the intransigent position and demands of the Turkish Cypriot
side, which laid well outside the key parameters of the plan.
Let me underline that there
have been serious inaccuracies, as well as wrong assumptions, in your Report,
which are pointed out in the attached Annex. The most serious of them is the
erroneous interpretation of the choice of the Greek Cypriot community at the
referendum of April 24, namely that by the disapproval of this specific Plan
Greek Cypriots have voted against the reunification of their country.
Such a claim is unfounded
and insulting. It should not be forgotten that a substantial number of those
voting were refugees, 70 per cent of which voted ''no'', and who for more than
thirty years have been deprived of their human rights, particularly their
rights to return and to property, due to the presence of 35,000 troops and
119,000 illegally implanted Turkish settlers.
Another fallacious
assumption of the Report is that the Greek Cypriots are turning away from a
solution based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. I would be very
interested to look into any credible evidence, put forth in good will, pointing
out to even a single reference in our written proposals, submitted in Nicosia
and Burgenstock, which will support this assumption. The same can also be said
for our comments submitted orally. Moreover, our firm position taken through
all these years of deliberations does not justify in any way the inference of
such a claim.
In any event, I take this
opportunity to emphatically reiterate, once more, on behalf of the Greek
Cypriot side, the commitment of my people, as well as my strong personal one,
to the solution of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. At the same time, I am
compelled to reject the notion that the Plan submitted on 31 March 2004
constitutes the one and only, unique, blueprint of a bi-zonal, bi-communal
federation. Does anybody today claim that the previous versions of the Plan,
which were similarly presented as unique opportunities for the achievement of a
bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, were not so?
Turning to the Section of
the Report, outlining the alleged improvements inspired by the Greek Cypriot
concerns, I wish to point the following: the allegation that ''the overall
amount of property in the Turkish Cypriot State eligible to be reinstated to
Greek Cypriots would be roughly doubled as compared with the previous version
of the plan'' can be described as inaccurate. As you very well know, the Plan
includes a number of preconditions for reinstatement of properties, which limit
substantially the exercise of the right of Greek Cypriots to reinstatement, as
well as the percentage of properties that were to be reinstated to Greek
Cypriots in comparison to previous versions of the Plan.
Furthermore, the section
outlining the improvements of the sides bears an uncanny resemblance to a
well-known document of a permanent Security Council Member, widely circulated
at the time of the Burgenstock phase of negotiations, which strangely enough
even follows the same sequence for the improvements gained by both sides. The
most noteworthy element, however, of this section of the Report is the omission
of any reference to the benefits that Turkey, and others, accrued from the
provisions of the Plan.
Let me just outline just
some of the benefits gained by that country under the finalised version of the
Plan. Turkey true to her past role demanded (and obtained) divisive bi-zonality
provisions, strategic economic benefits, and ''security'' arrangements, with sufficient
troops, even if reduced in numbers, to allow her again to intervene militarily
through a bridgehead in Cyprus, a right Turkey still insists she enjoys, and
her continuing role make full independence impossible. Although, scarcely
touched on in the Plan and then only by reference, Turkey's powers of
intervention and supervision, are in reality enormous, because of its
continuing military presence in and near Cyprus. She has also insisted, through
the Turkish Cypriots, on binding the UCR by treaties which they entered into
with her and which provided for the integration of the Turkish Cypriot
constituent state into Turkey, persuading the UN to accept this and a new right
for the Turkish Cypriot State and Turkey to make agreements on investment and provision
of financial assistance. Turkey had also insisted on putting a brake on the
UCR/s economic development by securing provisions in the Law on the Continental
Shelf that prevents the UCR from exploring and exploiting her maritime
resources in the seas of Cyprus whilst interfering with the Treaty between
Egypt and the Republic of Cyprus on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic
Zone, which is an ill-omen as to how Turkey would in future have operated.
Another such example is the imposition of the ''Cooperative Agreement on Civil
Aviation with Turkey'' on Cyprus over the strong objection of the GCs. This
treaty would have imposed on Cyprus a common policy with Turkey in civil
aviation thus making the condition to changes in the management of Cyprus air
space subject to Turkey's consent. It would have also allowed Turkey to take
all necessary actions (even military action) in the event of any threat to
aircraft passengers, airport or aviation facilities.
In the aforementioned list,
which by no means is exhaustive, the greatest benefit for Turkey, secured to
the detriment of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots and consisting a clear
departure from the provisions of Annan III, has been the stationing of Turkish
troops on the island in perpetuity.
All these new provisions
clearly serving Turkish interests and aims in Cyprus explain to a large extent
why the Plan was overwhelmingly rejected by the Greek Cypriots, approved by the
Turkish Cypriot side and so emphatically endorsed by the Turkish Government.
The Greek Cypriots have every right to wonder how the United Nations, the very
guardian of international law, could adopt proposals inspired by the Turkish
side, which deliberately and unjustifiably limit the sovereignty exercised by
one of its Member States. In other words, the main objection by the Greek
Cypriot community to the Plan was the fact that foreign interests, primarily
Turkish ones, were satisfied, instead of those of the Cypriot population, Greek
and Turkish Cypriots alike.
Furthermore, the Turkish side
avoided conscientiously to reveal its thoughts on the issue of territory, thus
depriving the whole process of a significant element of potential meaningful
trade-offs. May be the Turkish side adopted this attitude having valid reasons
to expect that its demands would be more or less fully satisfied without having
to make any concessions on territory. In any event, the insinuation that the GC
side avoided somehow to discuss the territorial issue or missed an opportunity
as far a Karpas is concerned betrays, at best, failure to understand the nature
of GC concerns as expressed during the whole process or bad faith at worse. In
any event, this issue should have been dealt with by the United Nations proprio
moto when the percentage of displaced persons to return to their homes in the
area under TC administration was further curtailed by 3 per cent.
We were willing to accept,
on humanitarian grounds, that a number of Turkish settlers should have the
right to stay in Cyprus as citizens under the new state of affairs. What
however we were not willing to accept, as you very well knew, was that each and
every settler, indeed all, should be entitled to remain and ultimately acquire
citizenship. Neither we were ready to endorse new provisions allowing fresh
settlers flows in the future, thus altering further and distorting the
demographic balance on the island.
However, under the final
Plan not only the entirety of settlers were to remain in Cyprus and the
possibility for a permanent flow of settlers form Turkey was left open, but all
of them were allowed to vote during the referendum. This was so, despite
established international law and UN practice, and persistent repeated calls of
our side to the contrary, which were utterly disregarded. The end result, is
that once more the settlers have participated in formulating the will of
Turkish Cypriots during the referendum of April 24, and this against every norm
of international law and practice.
Functionality is not
exhausted to the composition of the Presidential Council or the setting up of a
Court of Primary Federal Jurisdiction. Functionality covers all the areas of
the operation of the state and our concern for functionality was reflected in
all of our proposals during the process covering, inter alia, federal legislation
and its practical application, the Central Bank, fiscal and monetary policy,
the curtailing of the various transitional periods, ensuring conformity with EU
obligations, the administrative structure and function of the federal
government, the decision-making process at all levels, the territorial aspect
and the issue of the missing persons. All of the GC suggestions concerning
functionality are fully documented, have been within the parameters of the Plan
and did not affect in any way the rights afforded by the Plan to the Turkish
Cypriots.
The objective of most of the
GC side's suggestions, viewed, as an integral whole, have been to achieve the
functionality and the workability of the solution, thus ensuring its viability
and smooth operation. The attainment of these objectives (functionality and
workability) could not be the automatic result of the adoption of a few
marginal elements contained in our relevant proposals in exchange for some new
Turkish Cypriot demands. Thus, on no account can [it] be claimed that [the]
''functionality and workability'' requirement had been met.
In addition, we maintain
serious doubts on whether the final Plan is compatible with the acquis
communautaire. As it is well known the European Commission did not, in any
case, examined one by one the provisions of the final Plan. The
Commission simply examined Annan I, not subsequent versions. Thus, it would be
interesting to know what the legal and jurisdictional organs of the EU have to
say on the final Annan Plan.
At any case, as it is well
known, what is of equal importance with the compatibility of the Plan with the
acquis, is the ability of Cyprus to function effectively within the EU as a
Member State, something that clearly has not been achieved by the Plan.
Excellency,
It is utterly inaccurate to
state, in paragraph 69, that I have never presented proposals on security to
the members of the Security Council. They are well cognizant of an aide memoire
distributed by the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the UN, on 20 April 2004,
during the deliberations on the British - American draft resolution. The
inclusion of this allegation is offensive, to say the least, because I have
personally pointed out this inaccuracy after Mr. Alvaro de Soto alleged so
publicly.
Moreover, the Greek Cypriot
side did not bring up the issue of security for the first time on 20 April. In
fact, on 15 March, we submitted a comprehensive voluminous paper concerning the
security issue, wherein our suggestions were elaborated in detail and with
absolute clarity. Either Your Excellency, advised by M[r]e. de Soto, did
not give serious consideration to our positions on such a crucial issue or Mr.
de Soto did not bother to read our paper with due care and attention.
We share the view that
membership in the European Union adds to the general feeling of security and we
hope that Turkey's European aspirations will lead her to display more respect
for international law norms and the implementation of UN resolutions. However,
it remains an uncontested fact that we still have serious security concerns as
a result of the presence of Turkish occupation troops and Turkish overall
behavior. Recent illustrations of the latter are the Resolutions relating to
Strovilia, that required the withdrawal of Turkey's occupation troops a few
meters away that had not been complied with. Even more disturbing and
insulting, for the United Nations itself, is the unheeded call by the Security
Council for Turkey to lift the restrictions imposed on UNFICYP.
Acceptance and
implementation of the Plan would have had profound consequences. Given that all
parts of the Plan constituted an integral whole and were of equal importance,
it was imperative that before embarking on its implementation all the proper
iron cast guarantees should have been in place that each and every party
concerned would comply with all of its obligations arising therefrom.
Regrettably, contrary to the
Secretary-General's aims in formulating the Plan, the arrangements for
implementing territorial adjustments under Annan V would have resulted in a
''win - great risk of losing ''situation'' and not in a ''win-win'' situation,
as intended by the Secretary-General. The arrangements, as envisaged under
Annan V, would have given the Turkish Cypriots real and considerable benefits
governmentally, politically, internationally, economically, security-wise etc,
from the very first day of the Foundation Agreement coming into operation. In
contrast, the two benefits for Greek Cypriots, namely territorial adjustments
and reductions in the size of the Turkish Army in Cyprus, would not begin
immediately, and would have taken a number of years to be phased in.
In this way, the
implementation of the Plan, especially those provisions of crucial interest to
the GCs, would have been contingent to Turkey's good will, which, for the last
30 years at least is far from forthcoming even in embryonic form. When for the
last thirty years, due lack of good will on the part of the Turkish side, no
progress whatsoever has been achieved in relatively simple issues of profound
humanitarian nature such as the investigation of the fate of the missing
persons, it would be very imprudent to rely on Turkey's good will for the full,
prompt and proper implementation of a Plan purporting to provide a
comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem.
More importantly, the
present Turkish Government, despite its efforts to present an image of a
country ready to cooperate and respect the norms of international law,
continues its unjustified hostile policy against Cyprus. Using its right of
veto, Turkey continues to hinder the accession of Cyprus to a number of
technical international organizations, amongst which the OECD. The commercial
fleet of Cyprus, a Member-State of the European Union, is still denied the
right to approach any Turkish ports. The most recent and illustrative action of
this deliberate Turkish policy was the extension of its customs union agreement
to nine of the ten new members of the European Union, the tenth being Cyprus
which was unreasonably excluded at the very moment when Turkey aspires to
future membership in the EU.
Under these circumstances,
one must logically wonder how much trust and confidence the Greek Cypriots can
place on vague promises, in the absence of concrete and ironclad guarantees,
that Turkey will fulfill all its commitments under the Plan. Experience has
unfortunately been pointing to the opposite direction, since no signs by Turkey
of an ending of its hostile acts against Cyprus are witnessed.
While we appreciate your
stated disapproval of the idea of separate recognition of the secessionist
entity in the occupied part of Cyprus, we strongly object to the conclusion of
the Report. In particular, we can not accept the suggestion contained in
paragraph 93, that members of the Council ''can give a strong lead to all
States to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies to eliminate
unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the
Turkish Cypriots, deeming such a move as consistent with Security Council
resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984)''. In any event, this suggestion lies
clearly outside the Secretary's General[‘s] good offices mission and is
in direct contravention to the SC resolutions and international law.
Furthermore, there is no
doubt that our common goal for the reunification of Cyprus will be negatively
affected for ever by such proposed actions, which undoubtedly will lead to the
upgrading of and creeping or overt recognition of this secessionist entity.
This would be done in direct violation of Security Council resolutions 541
(1983) and 550 (1984) and the prevalent norms of established international law.
The adoption by the Security Council of this particular suggestion will be
paradoxical, since it will amount to an incomprehensible negation of its own
categorical call to all States ''not to facilitate or in any way assist the
aforesaid entity''.
We strongly believe that the
welfare and prosperity of the people of Cyprus lie with the economic
integration of the two communities and the unification of the economy of
Cyprus, and not with the encouragement of separatist tendencies. In this
respect, any moves or initiatives, aiming at first sight to the economic development
of Turkish Cypriots, but with evidently hidden political extensions, create
nothing more than a disincentive for a solution and promote the permanent
division of the island.
Various methods elaborated by
certain circles for the direct opening of ports and airports in the occupied
part of Cyprus, as a mean[s] of facilitating the direct trade with these
''Areas'' of Cyprus, serve exactly this purpose. Such moves lack any sound
legal basis. In fact, based on outrageous justification proposals they clearly
try, unsuccessfully though, to promote and present a situation of external
trade with a secessionist entity as lawful. Not only all these efforts fail to
respect legality, but also more importantly the end result is that they violate
the very norms from which they try to derive their legal validity. The outcome
is a doubtful attempt to legalize an illegal situation in a territory of
Member-State of the EU, where the application of the acquis communautaire is
suspended, whilst at the same time creating serious practical problems, thus
setting dangerous precedents for the future.
The Government of the
Republic of Cyprus is the first to support the economic development of Turkish
Cypriots; an economic development based on the proper criteria that promote the
ultimate aim of facilitating the reunification of our country. We have shown
this in practice by the announcement and implementation of two packages of
measures, of 30 April 2003 and 26 April 2004 respectively. These measures have
in essence freed the intra island trade of agricultural and manufactured goods,
fisheries and minerals, produced in the northern part of Cyprus, as well as
their exports through the legal ports and airports of the Republic of Cyprus.
Unfortunately, due to political considerations, such far-reaching measures are
not being made use of, due to the insistence of the occupation regime for
direct trade through illegal ports and airports in violation of international
law.
It is more than evident that
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership are not genuinely interested about
the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community, but primarily for
the upgrading and ultimate recognition of the secessionist entity. In this
respect, I would also like to bring to your attention the efforts currently
under way for upgrading the status of the Turkish Cypriot community in the
Organization for the Islamic Conference to a ''Turkish Cypriot State''. I urge
your Excellency to seriously consider the direct implications of the suggestion
contained in paragraph 93 of the Report for the reunification of Cyprus.
I should be grateful if the
present letter is circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda
item 30, and of the Security Council.
Tassos Papadopoulos
OXI
! NO !
to
the Annan Plan